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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Charlynda Lynn Goggin appeals from her judgment of conviction for 
delivery of a controlled substance and delivery of paraphernalia; the state cross-
appeals challenging the district court's order granting a new trial on two 
conspiracy counts. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Goggin for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or 
possess with intent to deliver synthetic marijuana; conspiracy to deliver or 
possess with intent to deliver paraphernalia; delivery of synthetic marijuana; and 
delivery of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 490-94.) At the trial the district court 
instructed the jury that mistake of fact was a defense to conspiracy, but that 
ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense to any count. (R., pp. 889-90.) 
The jury found Goggin guilty on all counts. (R., pp. 920-25.) 
Goggin filed post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. (R., pp. 926-
29.) The district court denied the motion for acquittal, but granted the motion for 
a new trial as to the conspiracy verdicts. (R., pp. 1001-18.) In relation to the 
motion to acquit, the court determined that it was not contested that Goggin 
agreed with others to package and sell the synthetic marijuana, and in fact did 
so. (R., p. 1004.) The only question was whether she knew the material she 
packaged and sold was synthetic marijuana. (ld.) The district court set forth the 
evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that she did in fact know that the 
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material she packaged and sold as part of an ongoing operation was a synthetic 
marijuana: 
Morgan Alley testified in some detail about AM-2201 and the 
various other chemicals detected by the state lab. He knew they 
were synthetic cannabinoids. He described the process of infusing 
the plant material with the chemicals. He also testified to his belief 
that some of the synthetic cannabinoids were illegal, but that AM-
2201 was legal. He only intended to use AM-2201. 
The jury also had before it evidence that Goggin helped 
stock the store when it was opened. While the inventory contained 
some tobacco products, candy, and soft drinks, the bulk of the 
inventory consisted of containers of plant material ("Twizted 
Potpourri"), metal and glass pipes, bongs, and other devices 
associated with the use of illicit drugs. These devices consisted of 
such things as common household product containers modified to 
serve as hiding places for drugs, bottled drinks whose purpose is to 
help the user avoid the detection of illicit substances in urine tests, 
and grinders associated with separating the THe containing 
portions of marijuana plants from the other portions. There was also 
a large poster depicting the singer Bob Marley who is associated 
with the use of marijuana. The name of the store itself, The Red 
Eye Hut, and the logo depicting a bloodshot human eye are also 
associated with the use of marijuana if the jury believed the 
testimony from Detective Andrioli. There is evidence that the plant 
material was intended to be smoked for its hallucinogenic and 
intoxicating effect. Undercover detectives entered the store and 
purchased a metal pipe and containers of plant material from 
Goggin. In their conversation she jokingly mentions that her friends 
will be upset with the sale of the revolver pipe because it is popular. 
There was testimony that the revolver pipe is the type of device 
used for smoking marijuana or synthetic cannabinoids. Goggin, in 
her conversation with Detective Harmon during his undercover 
purchase, made reference to Twizted Potpourri as coming from out 
of state. She told Detective Harmon that it was legal. Given that she 
was selling it, in conjunction with a device commonly used for the 
smoking of cannabinoids, a jury could certainly conclude that 
Goggin knew she was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid, even 
though she mayor may not have thought it was illegal. 
In her initial interview with detectives after her arrest, Goggin 
at first said the plant material came from out-of-state. When 
confronted with the fact that she had been seen at the warehouse 
during surveillance, she admitted to her involvement in working at 
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the warehouse. A jury could certainly draw the conclusion that her 
misleading statements as to the origins of the plant material during 
the undercover sale, coupled with her initial interrogation, 
evidence[d] a guilty knowledge concerning the plant material. In 
addition, during her initial interview after arrest she was asked 
whether she personally used the substance. She responded by 
smiling and saying "it's not for human consumption." When pressed 
by the detective to be truthful and state the purpose of the material 
she responded to the effect "I'm not going to say it. We can just 
agree you and I both know what it's intended for." While on its face 
this is a denial of the nature of the substance, in context it reflects 
an admission that the product is smoked for its intoxicating effect. 
The fact that Goggin even discussed the legality or illegality of the 
product being produced in the warehouse is evidence that she 
knew it contained a synthetic cannabinoid. 
(R., pp. 1005-06.) Concluding there was "substantial evidence upon which a jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Goggin knew she was dealing with a 
synthetic cannabinoid," the court denied her motion to acquit as to all counts. 
(R., pp. 1008-09.) 
In relation to the motion for a new trial, the court concluded that there was 
no error in instructing the jury that there was no mistake of law defense to the 
delivery charges. (R., pp. 1010-11.) Concluding that conspiracy requires 
specific intent to violate the law, the court reasoned that mistake of law was a 
defense to those charges, that the giving of an instruction stating it was not was 
error, and that Goggin should have a new trial on the conspiracy counts to 
present the mistake of law defense. (R., pp. 1011-16.) 
The court later entered judgment on the delivery counts. (R., pp. 1021-
28.) Both parties appealed. (R., pp. 1031-40, 1042-45.) 
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ISSUES 
Goggin states the issues on appeal as: 
I. 
WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE CONVICTIONS 
II. 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AS TO THE DELIVERY COUNTS 
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Goggin failed to show that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the finding that Goggin knew the material she was packaging and selling 
was synthetic marijuana? 
2. Has Goggin failed to show the district court erred by refusing to instruct 
the jury that mistake of law is a defense to delivery of a controlled 
substance? 
The state further presents the following issue on cross appeal: 
3. Should the district court's order granting a new trial be reversed because 




The Evidence Shows Goggin Knew The Material She Was Packaging And 
Selling Was Synthetic Marijuana 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded there was substantial evidence supporting the 
jury's conclusion that Goggin knew the object of her conspiracies and deliveries 
was, respectively, synthetic marijuana and instruments to smoke the synthetic 
marijuana. (R., pp. 1002-09.) Goggin contends that she "did not know the 
nature of the substance that had been placed on the otherwise legal plant 
material (a mistake of fact), not that she knew what it was, but erroneously 
believed it was not a controlled substance (a mistake of law)" and, therefore, the 
evidence at trial does not support the verdict. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) This 
argument fails because the evidence established that Goggin did know the 
nature of the material she was involved in selling, and her belief that it was a 
legal substance, rather than a controlled substance, was a mistake of law and 
not a defense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) 
(citations omitted). 
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C. The Evidence Supports The Conclusion That Goggin Understood She 
Was Involved In The Business Of Selling Synthetic Mariiuana 
Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime. State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 925-26, 866 P.2d 181, 182-83 (1993). The requisite intent 
"is not the intent to commit the crime, but is merely the intent to knowingly 
perform the interdicted act .... " kL at 926, 866 P.3d at 183 (internal quotation 
and citation omitted). Lack of knowledge that the substance possessed was 
illegal "is irrelevant." kL Under Idaho's controlled substance laws, "the individual 
need not know the substance possessed is a controlled substance." State v. 
Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). Thus, for example, "if a 
person is charged with possession of cocaine, he need only know he is 
possessing cocaine. He need not know that cocaine is a controlled substance." 
kL at 241 n. 1, 985 P .2d at 121 n.1. 
There is really no dispute, below or on appeal, that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the inference that Goggin knew she was involved in the 
business of selling synthetic marijuana. Goggin instead asserts there was no 
evidence she knew the synthetic marijuana she was selling contained a 
"synthetic cannabinoid," and because not all means of producing a drug high are 
illegal, and not even all synthetic cannabinoids are illegal, there is insufficient 
evidence that she knowingly delivered or conspired to deliver a controlled 
substance or paraphernalia to consume the controlled substance. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 12-15.) This argument necessarily hinges on Goggin's ignorance of the 
legality of the controlled substance. Her ignorance of the specific chemical 
formulation of the synthetic marijuana, and her belief that it was not illegal to 
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possess or deliver the particular synthetic marijuana she in fact conspired to and 
did deliver, are simply not relevant and do not disprove her guilt. The evidence 
shows she went to work at a shop with a marijuana use theme, selling both 
products intended to produce a marijuana high and to be used to smoke the 
synthetic marijuana. The overall circumstances show she was knowingly 
involved in the business of selling synthetic marijuana, and therefore the 
evidence supports her conviction. 
Goggin next claims the district court erred when it concluded that "it is not 
a defense that she mistakenly believed the synthetic cannabinoids contained in 
the Twisted Potpourri were legal." (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) She gives the 
example of a driver who believes that a beverage does not contain alcohol 
having a viable mistake of fact argument to a charge of open container. (Id.) 
While the hypothetical driver has a mistake of fact defense, Goggin does not. 
Goggin's situation would be analogous to a hypothetical driver believing that the 
particular chemical formulation of alcohol in her beverage was not covered by the 
open container laws. It is not the district court that "confuses mistake of fact and 
mistake of law" (Appellant's brief, p. 17), it is Goggin. 
It is indisputable that Goggin went to work at a marijuana-themed "head 
shop" selling synthetic marijuana and pipes to smoke it in. The evidence was 
sufficient to show that Goggin in fact knew that the product she was selling was 
synthetic marijuana, and that the pipes she was selling were for consuming the 
synthetic marijuana sold in the shop. This evidence supports the verdict. That 
Goggin wrongly believed that the particular type of synthetic marijuana she was 
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selling was beyond the reach of the controlled substances laws did not shield her 
from conviction. Goggin has shown no error in the district court's conclusion that 
the evidence supports her convictions. 
II. 
Goggin Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Refusing To Instruct The 
Jury That Mistake Of Law Is A Defense To Delivery Of A Controlled Substance 
A. Introduction 
The trial court instructed the jury with the approved instruction that 
ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense. (R., p. 890; compare ICJI 1511.) 
Goggin complains that this defense "removed the specific intent element from the 
crimes of conspiracy and the knowledge element from the crimes of delivery." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 20.) Because mistake of law was not a defense to any of 
the charged crimes, there was no error in so instructing the jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 
261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 
P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). 
C. Ignorance Or Mistake Of Law Was Not A Defense 
Ignorance or mistake of law, even in good faith, is not a defense. Fox, 
124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 355, 145 
P.3d 917, 920 (Ct. App. 2006); Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 880, 993 P.2d 
1205, 1211 (Ct. App. 2000). Because ignorance or mistake of law is not a 
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defense, the court did not err by giving the approved instruction stating this to the 
jury. 
Goggin argues that "the combination" of the mistake of fact instruction 
being limited to conspiracy and the giving of the mistake of law instruction "could 
have misled the jury into believing that it had to convict [Goggin] of the delivery 
counts even if she was unaware of the nature of the substance (as opposed to its 
illegality)." (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) Although Goggin does not clearly articulate 
how this "combination" could have "misled" the jury into not considering her 
mistake of fact defense, a review of all the instructions certainly shows her 
concerns are without merit. 
The jury was instructed that it must find joint operation of act and intent. 
(R., p. 877.) The jury was instructed that it had to find that Goggin delivered 
paraphernalia or possessed it with intent to deliver "knowing, or under 
circumstances where the defendant reasonably should know, that it would be 
used" for ingesting a controlled substance. (R., p. 884.) The delivery charge 
required a finding that Goggin "either knew it was a Schedule I synthetic 
cannabinoid or believed it was a controlled substance." (R., p. 900.) The jury 
was further instructed that "synthetic cannabinoids" are controlled substances. 
(R., p. 886.) Thus, the jury could only convict upon a finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Goggin either knew or believed that the substance she 
sold, or that was to be consumed in the pipes she sold, was a synthetic 
cannabinoid. The mistake of law instruction merely prevented the jury from 
concluding that Goggin was not guilty if she believed that she was dealing in a 
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legal synthetic cannabinoid. Her mistake of fact defense was preserved by these 
instructions and there was no error in giving an instruction that ignorance or 
mistake of law was not a defense. 
III. 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded Intent To Violate The Law Is An 
Element Of Conspiracy In Idaho 
A. Introduction 
At trial the district court gave the standard jury instruction on ignorance or 
mistake of law: 
When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that 
which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the 
person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person 
believed it to be lawful. 
(R., p. 890; compare ICJI 1511.) The court granted a new trial after concluding 
that specific intent to violate the law is required for a conspiracy conviction, and 
therefore Goggin should get a new trial on the conspiracy counts. (R., pp. 1011-
16.) The district court erred, and the order granting a new trial must be vacated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a matter 
of law. I.C. § 19-2406(5). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 
P.2d 67,70 (1995); State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 143, 145, 128 P.3d 960, 962 (Ct. 
App. 2006). The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of 
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 
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140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Ignorance Or Mistake Of 
Law Is A Defense To Conspiracy In Idaho 
It is a "deeply rooted" principle of American legal jurisprudence that 
"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution." 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); see also State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) ("Ignorance of the law is not a 
defense." (citations omitted»); see also I.C. § 18-101(1), (5). An exception to this 
rule exists in limited circumstances when the claimed mistake "negatives the 
existence of a mental state essential to the crime charged." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.6(a) (2d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted). But unless a 
criminal statute contains "specific language to the contrary, ignorance of a law is 
not a defense to a charge of its violation." Morgan v. Hale, 584 P.2d 512, 517 
(Cal. 1978), quoted in Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; see also United 
States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (unless crime requires proof 
of knowledge of law, "prosecution need not show that a defendant knew the 
illegality of the conduct with which he is charged"); United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 
639, 643 (10th Cir. 1995) (absent a clear statutory directive to the contrary, even 
specific intent crimes "do not, as a rule, necessitate a showing the defendant 
intentionally violated a known legal duty"). Idaho's conspiracy statutes contain 
no language, much less specific language, indicating that ignorance of the law 
would disprove guilt. 
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The state charged Goggin under both the general conspiracy statute, I.C. 
§ 18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). (R., p. 490.) Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a general 
criminal conspiracy is defined as follows: 
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit 
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, 
and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the 
object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable 
upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 
provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of 
the crime or offenses that each combined to commit. 
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly 
provides: 
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense 
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons 
shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, which may 
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, 
the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). 
Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty of 
conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an illegal act and at 
least one of the conspirators does some act in furtherance of the illegal 
objective. 1 Consistent with this plain reading of the statutes, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly stated that a conspiracy under Idaho law consists of 
three essential elements: "(1) the existence of an agreement to accomplish an 
1 There is no language in I.C. § 37-2732(f) requiring an act in furtherance of a 
conspiracy to commit an offense proscribed by the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act. Nevertheless, because the state also charged Taylor under I.C. 
§ 18-1701, it is undisputed that an act in furtherance was an element of the 
conspiracy as charged. 
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illegal objective, (2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the 
illegal purpose and (3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying 
substantive offense." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. 
App. 1990)); accord State v. Tankovich, 2013 WL 3467056 *3 (Idaho App., July 
23, 2013) (petition for review pending); State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 201 
P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 
1279,1281 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461,466,745 P.2d 1082, 
1087 (Ct. App. 1987). See also ICJI 1101 (intent element of conspiracy is "that 
the crime would be committed" (bracketed language omitted).) While the state 
must prove as an element of a conspiracy charge that the defendant had the 
requisite intent to commit the underlying offense, nowhere in the conspiracy 
statutes or in the case law interpreting them is there any requirement that the 
state also prove the defendant intended to violate the law or knew of the illegality 
of the agreed-upon act. In other words, intent to break the law or knowledge that 
a law will be broken is simply not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law. 
Rather than examining the plain language of the charging statutes, the 
district court determined that proof of intent to violate the law was a necessary 
requisite to Goggin's conviction because conspiracy is a specific intent crime. 
(R., pp. 1013-15.) Although "[i]t is generally accepted that conspiracy is a 
specific intent crime," Tankovich, 2013 WL 3467056 at *3; Rolon, 146 Idaho at 
691, 201 P.3d at 664, "specific intent" does not usually, much less necessarily, 
mean intent to violate the law, see I.C. § 18-101(5) ("knowingly" does not "require 
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any knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act"); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643 (quoting 
United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] specific intent 
crime 'normally does not necessitate proof that the defendant was specifically 
aware of the law penalizing his conduct."'). As explained by the Court of Appeals 
in Rolon, the specific intent required for a conspiracy conviction is "the intent to 
agree or conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the 
conspiracy." Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664 (emphasis original); 
accord Tankovich, 2013 WL 3457056 at *3. As already established, in this case 
mistake or ignorance of the law does not negate intent to commit the underlying 
offenses. See,~, Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183 (intent required for 
possession of controlled substance is only "the knowledge that one is in 
possession of the substance"). Likewise, ignorance or mistake of law does not 
negate the intent to agree or conspire to commit the underlying offenses.2 
In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975), the Supreme Court of 
the United States rejected Feola's argument that, on a charge of conspiracy to 
assault federal officers in the performance of their duties, the prosecution was 
required to "show a degree of criminal intent ... greater than is necessary to 
convict for the substantive offense." Like Idaho's conspiracy statutes, the federal 
2 In this regard, the specific intent associated with conspiracy is similar to the 
specific intent to commit burglary (intent to commit a theft or felony) see State v. 
Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 343, 247 P.3d 204, 209 (Ct. App. 2010), forgery 
(intent to defraud), State v. McAbee, 130 Idaho 517,519, 943 P.2d 1237, 1239 
(Ct. App. 1997), or possession with intent to deliver, State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 
700, 705-06, 889 P.2d 729, 734-35 (Ct. App. 1994) (intent to deliver). 
Undersigned counsel is unaware of any authority indicating that ignorance or 
mistake of law would be defenses to these crimes merely because they require a 
finding of specific intent. 
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statute at issue in Feola provided in relevant part that a criminal conspiracy is 
committed when "two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against 
the United States, '" and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the 
object of the conspiracy." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687 n.20 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
371 )). Upon examination of that statute, the Supreme Court found "no textual 
support for the proposition that to be guilty of conspiracy a defendant in effect 
must have known that his conduct violated federal law." kL at 687. The Court 
reasoned: 
The statute makes it unlawful simply to 'conspire ... to commit any 
offense against the United States.' A natural reading of these 
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply 
by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that 
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the 
prohibited acts. 
kL (ellipses original). The Court also pointed to its prior decisions in In re Coy, 
127 U.S. 731 (1888), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), noting 
that in both cases the Court "declined to require a greater degree of intent for 
conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive 
offense." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687-88. 
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that, absent an 
express statutory directive to the contrary, the intent required to sustain a 
conspiracy conviction is merely that required for commission of the underlying 
substantive crime. See, ~, United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 
2012) (on charge of conspiracy to commit illegal gambling, government was 
required to prove same degree of criminal intent as required for proof of 
underlying sUbstantive offense); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th 
15 
Cir. 1995) (where substantive offenses did not require proof of intent to violate 
the law, defendants could be guilty of conspiring to commit sUbstantive offenses 
even if they were not aware their actions were illegal); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643 
("prosecution need not prove a defendant intentionally violates a known legal 
duty in order to sustain a conviction under [general federal conspiracy statute] in 
cases where the underlying substantive offense does not impose such a 
requirement"); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding 
"no reason to believe ... from the words of the statute or from general criminal 
law doctrine, that the quantum of mens rea required for a RICO conspiracy 
should be different from or greater than that required for a substantive RICO 
offense"); People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d 1076 (Cal. App., 2d Dist., 1952) ("The 
guilt of those who conspire to do an act which is prohibited by law is measured 
by their intent with reference to the act to be performed and not by the amount of 
their knowledge or ignorance of whether such acts are contrary to statute."). 
Like the conspiracy statutes at issue in the above-cited cases, the statutes 
under which Goggin was charged offer "no textual support" for the district court's 
conclusion that "intent to violate the law" is a necessary element of conspiracy. 
As in Feola, the statutes at issue in this case make it unlawful simply to "conspire 
to commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws" of this state, I.C. § 18-
1701, or to "conspire to commit any offense defined in" the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). Also as in Feola, "[a] natural reading of these 
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply by engaging 
in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that offense is nothing more 
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than an agreement to engage in the prohibited act." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687. 
Accordingly, as in Feola and the other cases cited, the state need not prove an 
intent to violate the law to sustain a conspiracy conviction, unless such intent is 
required for commission of the underlying substantive crime. Because the 
Uniform Controlled Substance Act violations that were the objects of the charged 
conspiracies in this case did not require knowledge of the illegality or intent to 
violate the law, see I.C. §§ 37-2732(a), 37-2734B; Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 
P.2d 183, Goggin was guilty of conspiracy merely by having the specific intent to 
commit the proscribed acts (i.e., the delivery or possession with intent to deliver 
synthetic cannabinoids and paraphernalia, respectively), regardless of her 
knowledge or lack thereof that the acts were illegal. 
Idaho's conspiracy statutes, by their plain language, do not require as an 
element either knowledge that the object of the conspiracy is illegal or intent to 
violate the law. Nor do the crimes that were the objects of the conspiracies in 
this case require knowledge they were proscribed by law. Because neither the 
conspiracy statutes nor the substantive criminal statutes under which Goggin 
was charged require any specific intent to violate the law, Goggin's alleged 
ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense to the charged conspiracies. The 
trial court thus erred by granting Goggin a new trial to allow a jury to consider this 
nonexistent defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the jury's verdicts and 
the respective convictions for delivery of a controlled substance and delivery of 
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paraphernalia, to reverse the order granting a new trial on the conspiracy counts, 
and to remand for sentencing proceedings on the jury's verdicts of guilt on the 
conspiracy counts. 
DATED this 27th day of Septem er,2013. 
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